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Abstract
Woman suffrage led to the greatest enfranchisement in the history of the United States.
Before World War I, however, suffrage states remained almost exclusively confined to the
American West. The reasons for this pioneering role of the West are still unclear. Studying
the timing of woman suffrage adoption at state level, we find that states in which women were
scarce (the West) enfranchised their women much earlier than states in which the sex ratio
was more balanced (the rest of the country). High sex ratios in the West, that is high ratios of
grantors to grantees, reduced the political costs and risks to male electorates and legislators of
extending the franchise. They are also likely to have enhanced female bargaining power and
may have made woman suffrage more attractive in the eyes of western legislators that sought
to attract more women to their states. Our finding of a reduced-form inverse relationship
between the relative size of a group and its success in securing the ballot may be of use also
for the study of other franchise extensions and for inquieries into the dynamics of political
power sharing more generally.
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Sex antagonism ... is sure to be reflected in the political. This factor, however,
will play a far bigger part in the East than it does in the West ... where the females
outnumber the males.
Journalist George MacAdam on ”Obstacles in Path of Nation-wide Suffrage”, The New
York Times, January 27, 1918.
1 Introduction
Woman suffrage in the United States led to the greatest enfranchisement in the country’s history.
Access to the ballot was first won at state level. Between 1869, when Wyoming Territory first
granted its women the right to vote, and the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920,
which prohibited the federal government and states to deny or abridge in any way the voting rights
of citizens on account of their sex, twenty-nine states enfranchised their women. Rates of suffrage
adoption over this period, however, differed markedly across regions. In fact, until the outbreak of
World War I, woman suffrage remained essentially confined to the American West: of the twelve
states that granted women access to the ballot by 1914, ten lie in the West; and so do all five states
that enfranchised their women before the turn of the century. The reasons for this pioneering role
of the American West are still unclear. Studying the timing of suffrage extensions at the level of
US states, this paper seeks to uncover the driving forces that made the American West lead the
nation in the enfranchisement of women.
Understanding extensions of the franchise to women is important. First, woman suffrage concerns
one of the core decisions a society may take, that is the choice of its eligible electorate. In democ-
racies, electorates determine the political elite and they decide ultimately on the use of public
resources. Suffrage extensions change the eligible electorate, which makes them - their causes and
consequences - a natural subject for research in political economy. Second, in the history of suf-
frage extensions, woman suffrage beyond doubt has to be counted the most important. As the most
ubiquitous extension of the ballot across countries in history, it gave political representation to un-
precedented numbers, and often to the majority of a country’s population, changing fundamentally
the role and understanding of women in societies. And third, studying the forces that drove the
extension of the ballot to women may provide important insights into the political economy of
power sharing more generally. For woman suffrage extensions involve a more general and timeless,
yet little researched issue in economics, the question what factors may induce a ruling group to
share power with others, even if the latter do not possess the potential to acquire political access
by force or other means, or credibly may threat to do so if such rights are not granted voluntarily.
Understanding extensions of the franchise to women may help to shed some light on this important
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question.
Although a prime area for research in political economy, the driving forces behind woman suffrage
in the US (and other countries) have surprisingly been studied almost exclusively only by non-
economists, in particular by historians. Many of these scholars (e.g. Beeton, 1986) have stressed
idiosyncratic features of individual states to explain their respective timing of adopting woman
suffrage. However, by stressing the specific rather than the common features held by early suffrage
states and by focusing heavily on the early period in which first jurisdictions granted women access
to the ballot, such approaches cannot explain the marked and sustained regional pattern of state
level extensions of the franchise to women. The pioneering role and continuing lead of states in
the American West in the adoption of woman suffrage, however, suggest that common, rather
than state-specific factors were decisive in driving extensions of the franchise to women. Sociolo-
gist, in turn, have focused mostly on the woman suffrage movement in the United States and the
importance of its leading national organizations, their activities, and main antagonists (see, for
example, McCammon et al., 2001). However, their strong focus on woman suffrage organizations
is squarely at odds with the fact that woman suffrage was first won, and continued to be won for
decades exclusively in the West, a region that that was far less than others organized in terms of
coordinated activities for securing the ballot.
In the economic literature, researchers have concentrated on the consequences of extending the
franchise to women, particularly for the overall size of government and for public spending in
certain areas (see, for example, Lott and Kenny (1999) and Miller (2008) for the US, and Aidt,
Dutta, and Loukoianova (2006) for European countries). Extensions of the suffrage to women in
this literature, however, are assumed exogenous events. This appears problematic. In the US, as
noted, woman suffrage adoption exhibited a marked regional pattern. And in Europe, suffrage
adoption by countries clustered significantly in the immediate aftermaths of the two world wars,
systematic patterns that cast doubt on the validity of this identifying assumption.1 To the best
of our knowledge, only one economic study has analysed the driving forces behind woman suffrage
extensions (Kenny, 1999).2 Kenny studies the timing of state-level extensions of the franchise to
women in the United States in the period 1890 to 1920. Although confining his analysis only
to a subset of the actual franchise extensions, that is the later ones and those of states but not
of territories, Kenny raises an important general point which helps to structure investigations of
woman suffrage extentions, a point that is central also to our hypotheses-building and analysis.3
1In 1918, Austria, England, Germany, and Poland granted women access to the ballot, followed by the Netherlands
and Luxembourg in 1919, Albania, Belgium, and the Czech Republic in 1920, Sweden in 1921, and Ireland in 1922.
After World War II, European countries that joined the rank of woman suffrage states for the first time include
France (1944) and Croatia, Italy, Montenegro, and Slovenia (all four in 1945).
2We are grateful to Lawrence W. Kenny for providing us with a copy of his draft version.
3By restricting the analysis to the period 1890-1920 and to suffrage extension by states only, the earliest suffrage
extensions in Wyoming (1869), Utah (1870), and Washington (1883) are excluded from the analysis.
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Kenny speculates that states in which the costs of woman suffrage were lower for men should have
tended to enfranchise women earlier and that these costs should be negatively correlated with state
sex ratios, as a relative scarcity of women (a high sex ratio) implied a smaller potential change
”in the political equilibrium” if women were given the right to vote (Kenny, 1999, p. 8). Using
socio-economic data from a single year (1890), which includes a measure of the adult sex ratio
(residents aged 21 or older), Kenny finds supportive evidence in his empirical analysis (a Weibull
failure time model) for his conjecture that the rate of suffrage adoption is positively associated
with the sex ratio. Because of the quite short observation period and the exclusive focus on states
in the analysis, however, it is unclear whether this finding for later adopters of woman suffrage
generalizes to explain in its entirety patterns of suffrage extensions to women in the United States.
Covering both states and territories and expanding the period of analysis and the factors consid-
ered that may have influenced men in their decision to grant women access to the ballot, our study
addresses this question. Using decennial US census data for the period 1860 to 1920, it provides
first evidence on both the early and the later period of suffrage extensions in the United States.
Furthermore, by investigating the pioneering role and sustained lead of the American West in the
enfranchisement of women, it also explores the explanatory power of several leading factors that
have been suggested in the non-economic literature to underlie regional patterns of woman suffrage
adoption.
Apart from complementing economic studies that have focused on the consequences of woman
suffrage, our paper hence contributes in two important ways to the economic literature. Foremost,
and extending the analysis of Kenny (1999), we provide a first analysis of the driving forces be-
hind extensions of the suffrage to women in the United States in the period 1869 to 1920, that is
from the year Wyoming Territory first enfranchised women to the ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment, an analysis that can account both for the pioneering role of the American West and
for its sustained lead in the enfranchisement of women. And second, our analysis complements and
enriches the growing body of literature in economics that is concerned with the effects of sex ratio
imbalances on marriage, fertility, and labor market outcomes, by investigating a hitherto largely
disregarded outcome domain, female political rights.
Corroborating the conjecture and first results of Kenny (1999), our findings show that the adult
sex ratio in a jurisdiction exerted a robust and decisive influence on the rate at which women were
granted access to the ballot. Specifically, we find high sex ratio jurisdictions, that is jurisdictions
in which women (the potential grantees of woman suffrage) were relatively scarce compared to
men (the grantors of woman suffrage), to enfranchise their women much earlier than jurisdictions
in which the sex ratio was more balanced. As high sex ratio jurisdictions both in the mid to late
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19th and early 20th century were predominantly located in the American West, a result of the
late and strongly male-biased settlement of the Frontier, high sex ratios can explain the pioneering
role of this region and its sustained lead in the advancement of the woman suffrage cause. Un-
observed time invariant factors and female employment levels also appear to have exerted some
positive influence on the hazard of a jurisdiction (states and territories) to enfranchise its women.
Other factors we find conducive to woman suffrage include the degree of urbanity and the share of
Mormons in a jurisdiction. A higher percentage of nonwhites and a larger manufacturing sector,
in contrast, appear to have delayed woman suffrage adoption. Differences in political institutions
and in the openness of the political system, however, proved to be immaterial for the speed at
which jurisdictions granted women access to the ballot. Neither territorial status, a proxy for
the procedural ease of extending the franchise, nor indicators for voting regulations (secret ballot,
literacy tests, and voting tax) that we used to proxy for the general openness of a state political
body exerted any influence on the rate of suffrage adoption. In summary, therefore, we find several
factors to have been influential in either accelerating or delaying woman suffrage adoption in a
jurisdiction. Overall, however, our results suggest that the severe imbalances in the adult sex ratio
between jurisdictions in the second half of the 19th and early 20th century were decisive for the
very differential rates at which women were granted access to the ballot in the United States.
Our findings suggest that woman obtained the right to vote earlier in the American West because
they were fewer in relative numbers in this than in other regions of the country. The most likely
explanation for this finding is that high sex ratios in the West have altered the power calculus for
men, the pre-woman-suffrage electorate and potential grantors of voting rights. In the American
West, the enfranchisement of few rather than many women carried lower potential costs for men in
terms of any devaluation of their own vote and influence than in other parts of the country. At the
same time, and also potentially conducive to early woman suffrage, high sex ratios in the American
West may have increased the bargaining power of women vis-a-vis men, enabling them to demand
more successfully the recognition of their political rights. Furthermore, and complementing these
causal pathways, legislators of states in which sex ratios were skewed toward men might have
viewed woman suffrage also as a viable tool to attract female settlers to their jurisdictions.
Our main finding of an inverse relationship between the size and likely success of a group that seeks
the franchise may prove useful also for the study of other franchise extensions, and for inquiries into
the dynamics of political power sharing more generally. It may help to understand, for example,
why it took the American South so long to grant its large black population full political rights,
or why countries often find it so difficult to grant ethnic minorities greater self-governing powers,
when these minorities account for a significant share of their citizens.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 documents the history of woman suffrage in the
United States from the mid nineteenth century to the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment
in 1920. It also considers theoretical arguments on the likely determinants of woman suffrage
adoption, and reviews the non-economic literature on the subject. Section 3 describes the data
and methods used, Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 The Enfranchisement of Women in the US, 1869-1920
In 1848, at Seneca Falls, New York, pioneering suffragists assembled in a landmark convention to
adopt a resolution that called for universal woman suffrage. In light of recent developments both
at home and abroad, chances to secure the ballot must have seemed promising at the time. In-
ternationally, similar suffrage movements as the one in the United States began to emerge around
the same time in Australia, England, New Zealand, and the Scandinavian countries. And leading
intellectuals began to raise their voice demanding full recognition of womens’ political rights and
an end to the long-standing subjugation of women by men.4 Nationally, early property qualifica-
tions had been revoked. And suffrage rights had been extended so that a majority of the adult,
white, male population by now was eligible to cast their vote. However, as it turned out, Seneca
advocates had to wait another three quarters of a century to see their goal finally accomplished in
full.
Supportive of the abolitionist cause and involved in other reform movements before and during
the Civil War, the woman suffrage movement received its major set back in the second half of the
1860’s, just when victory seemed at its closest. First, abolitionist leaders withdrew their support
for woman suffrage, as it became clear that continuing public support would be harmful to their
own cause. Then, with slavery abolished in 1865, the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 granted
freedman the long-awaited franchise, but made no mention of women rights. Ironically, and bitter
for women, it was this very Fourteenth Amendment that first inserted the word ”male” into the US
Constitution. Ensuing internal quarrels over goals and methods led to a split of the woman suffrage
movement in 1869 into the more radical New-York-based National Woman Suffrage Association
(NWSA) and the moderate Boston-based American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA). These
two woman suffrage organizations, later merged to form the National American Woman Suffrage
Association (NAWSA), further popularized the woman suffrage cause and molded an increasing
awareness of the issue both among politicians and among the population at large.
4Forceful articulants include Harriet Taylor in her 1851 article on the enfranchisement of women and John Stuart
Mill in his 1869 essay on the subjection of women.
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Despite their setback in securing universal suffrage for women by way of constitutional amend-
ment, however, suffragists did not have to wait long to see the first women vote in the United
States. In 1869, the territorial legislature of remote Wyoming granted its women access to ballot,
followed in 1870 by the territorial legislature of neighboring Utah.5 This victories were stunning,
both for where and how they occured. It was not New York, nor New England, which housed the
headquarters of the two national woman suffrage organizations, that led the nation in first extend-
ing the franchise to women. Moreover, any suffragist activity in these two territories had been
minor at best. This paradox has bewildered historians. All the more so, since the American West
continued to lead the nation in the enfranchisement of women for the following forty plus years.6
The Territory of Washington enfranchised its women in 1883, followed by the states of Colorado
(1893) and Idaho (1896).7 They were joined in 1911 by the state of California, in 1912 by the state
of Oregon and Arizona (which became a state in the same year), and in 1913 by the Territory of
Alaska. Also in 1912, and a full forty-three years after pioneering Wyoming, the first non-western
state (Kansas) adopted woman suffrage, followed in 1913 by yet another (Illinois). In 1914, two
more western states enfranchised their women (Nevada and Montana), making New Mexico the
only non-suffrage state to remain in the American West. A stunning seventeen states adopted
woman suffrage between 1917 and 1919, most of which were from the Midwest. The remaining
nineteen non-suffrage states, in the majority from the South and Northeast, were finally forced in
1920, through the ratification by Congress of the Nineteenth Amendment to the US Constitution,
to grant their women access to the ballot. As this timeline illustrates, the American West assumed
a clear pioneering role in the adoption of woman suffrage in the United States.8
Other statistics corroborate this view. According to Catt and Shuler (1923), there had been 480
campaings in thirty-three states between 1870 and 1910 to get state legislatures to submit suffrage
amendments to voters. Although these campaigns resulted in only seventeen referendums in eleven
states, it is again telling to find that fourteen of these were held west of the Mississippi, and that
the only two ensuing successes occured in Colorado and Utah (Grimes, 1967). Evidently, woman
suffrage was on the political agenda and mind of people also in states other than in the American
West in this period. Yet, for reasons that still await explanation, only in the West did it manage
to amass the support necessary to become a reality.
5Congress, however, revoked Utah women’s right to vote in the Edmunds-Tucker Bill of 1887, as part of an effort
to end the practice of polygamy in the Mormon-dominated territory. Woman suffrage was reinstituted in Utah by
constitutional referendum when Utah was admitted statehood in 1896.
6As noted in Miller (2008, p.1292-1293), ”the remarkably poor correspondence between suffrage movement
strength and the enactment of suffrage laws” is evinced also by ”... equivalent suffrage organization membership in
the West and the South (where suffrage efforts were most and least successful, respectively)”.
7In Washington Territory, the territorial legislature in fact enacted woman suffrage twice (1883, 1887), but each
time the enactment was rescinded, after being declared void, on technical grounds, by the territorial supreme court.
Woman suffrage was finally adopted in Washington in 1910.
8See Table A-1 in the appendix for a complete tabulation of the dates at which individual jurisdictions (states
and territories) first adopted woman suffrage.
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Some historians see ’frontier egalitarianism’ as a major driving factor. According to this view,
”frontier conditions undermined traditional gender roles” (Wheeler, 1995, p. 11) and furthered
”notions of equality and democracy” (Larson, 1970, p. 10) in the West. Others argue that po-
litical expediency on the part of territorial legislatures was decisive for the leading role of the
American West. Specifically, this view holds that territories saw ”woman suffrage as a means to
publicize their regions and hopefully attract settlers, investors, and support for their admission
to the Union as states” (Beeton, 1995, p. 115). A prime, yet non-representative, example often
cited in this context is Mormon-dominated Utah, where woman suffrage allegedly was granted
to further the territory’s bid for statehood in the face of fierce opposition from Congress to the
practice of polygamy. Still other researchers have pointed to the importance of procedural reasons
that advantaged the adoption of woman suffrage in the territories. For most states needed an
amendment to their state constitution, which required both legislative endorsement and public
approval in a referendum. In territories, in contrast, all that was needed to enfranchise women was
an enactment of the territorial legislature with the approval of the territorial governor. Finally, it
has been argued that safety reasons made the testing of woman suffrage in the territories partic-
ularly attractive, as residents in territories could vote neither for their own governor, nor for the
president. And Congress, who controlled the territories, could revoke female voting rights at any
time if necessary. Hence in territories, neither ”the political stability of the established states nor
the national political scene would be seriously altered” (Beeton, 1995, p. 102-103), or put at great
risk, if women were enfranchised.
While each of these factors may have had its part in making the West, or parts of it, more conducive
to the woman suffrage cause at a certain time, it is clear that none of them suffices to account for
the pioneering role and sustained lead of the American West in adopting woman suffrage. Three of
the four factors are simply too limited in scope: taking reference exclusively to territories, they can-
not explain why the first states to introduce woman suffrage are also found in the West (Colorado,
Idaho, and California). Frontier egalitarianism, in turn, can hardly qualify as an explanation for
the continuing high rates of suffrage adoption in the West in the early 20th century.9 And neither
can the other three factors. All therefore, at best, provide potential explanations only for the early
period of suffrage extensions in the United States. Factors less transient and more chacteristic
of the West than the ones considered, however, are required if one wants to understand also its
persistent lead.
9In the decade up to an including 1914, seven states/territories granted women suffrage. Five of them from the
West (Arizona, California, Montana, Oregon, and Nevada).
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2.2 Theoretical Considerations
Any explanation or theorizing on the extension of the suffrage to women in the United States has
to honour three basic facts. First, women in the United States in the 19th century first obtained
the right to vote in the American West, and it was states again in the West that also led the nation
in first enfranchising their women in the early 20th century. Second, it was always men, that is
male electorates and male state legislatures, that granted women access to the ballot. And third,
women at no time either had the means, the organizational cohesion, or the will to demand by
force or otherwise their political rights against any dedicated opposition of men. These facts are
important. The first calls for a thorough inquiry into the factors that account for the pioneering
role and sustained lead of the American West. The second underscores the need to put male
considerations center stage in any such inquiry, that is the incentives and risks faced by the very
grantors of woman suffrage. And the third sets clear confines on the scope of factors that may
have entered the calculus of male deliberations in favor or against woman suffrage. The latter, in
particular, excludes mere female threat potential as a factor, that is the ability of women to revolt,
boycott, or obstruct social and economic life on a scale that would secure political concessions.
Without doubt important, and often decisive, in many other struggles for political rights in history,
such a factor is clearly irrelevant for the adoption and spread of woman suffrage in the United
States.10
Woman suffrage, no doubt, implied a massive extension of the franchise. But as it ”cut through all
classes, religions, races, and national origins” (Grimes, 1967, p. 4), there were no general subgroups
of men to act as natural advocates or opponents of woman suffrage. Men in general, however, had
much to lose. Depending on the relative size of the adult female population in a state, the votes
and hence political influence of men could be significantly devaluated (Kenny, 1999). And political
and broader societal stability could be put at considerable risk. There is ample evidence that
considerations of this kind were a concern to contemporaries, as evinced by public deliberations in
Congress, in state legislatures, and in the national press. In particular, the risks, both the imminent
and the more general, involved in granting women suffrage rights were intensively debated: some
feared a de-feminization of women, others a feminization of politics; furthermore, many saw the
traditional roles of women and men at stake, both in the domestic and in the economic sphere,
should women get access to the ballot; and more than a few men questioned the very capability of
women to act as responsible voters. An illustrative and vivid example of such concerns is provided
by deliberations of delegates at a meeting in 1894 of the Constitutional Convention of the State of
New York, which considered various woman suffrage amendments. As reported in The New York
10Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), for instance, argue that nineteenth century extensions of the franchise to men
were concessions on part of the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution.
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Times on August 16, 1894, one delegate at the meeting noted that the ”functions of the sexes
were different” and that politics ”is full of strive, bitterness, and heartburnings, wholly unsuited
to the womanly character. Women in strife becomes harsh, hard, and repulsive.” Another argued
that ”evils would results, not only to the State, but to womankind, by conferring suffrage upon
females ... which will develop and increase estrangement, separations, infidelity, and divorce, and
the consequent destruction of home.”
Any such risks, however, were intrinsically smaller in magnitude and hence must have appeared
more manageable in the West because there simply were not much women, save in Utah and in
New Mexico, to distort political and social life significantly and beyond repair. According to the
1870 census, the ratio of men to women aged 15-49 was 95:100 in the Northeast, 93:100 in the
South, and 126:100 in the Midwest, but a stunning 330:100 in the West, a result of the late and
strongly male-biased settlement of the frontier. Although ratios subsequently converged between
regions in the decades that followed, the American West continued to record a pronounced shortage
of women. In 1910, the sex ratio of men to women aged 15-49 was still 150:100 in the West, which
compares to 104:100 in the Northeast, 102:100 in the South, and 112:100 in the Midwest. In other
words, from the Restauration period to World War I, the American West exhibited a significantly
higher ratio of men (potential grantors) to women (potential grantees), an imbalance that insured
against too drastic a distortion of political and social life should the experiment of woman suffrage
go indeed awry.11
Although debates surrounding woman suffrage were usually cast in terms of morals and basic rights,
contemporaries were well aware of the pronounced sex ratio imbalances in the American West and
conscious of the fact that the political risks involved in granting women access to the ballot in a
constituency would to a significant degree depend on the respective size of the female population
to be enfranchised. As noted in a brief comment by The Nation, March 3, 1870 on the Wyoming
experiment, the political consequences of woman suffrage in this territory were inherently limited
and of little information value for other states because ”... the women there are but a handful, ...
so that their use of the franchise will hardly shed much light on the general question.” Nearly fifty
years later, in a different context and concerning the east coast, similar thoughts on arithmetics
can still be found. In a letter to the editor, published in The New York Times on November 3
1917, a man pointed to the risks involved in granting women suffrage in the State of New York
for the country’s war effort, a risk he deemed particularly high in light of the numbers of women
that would be enfranchised: ”If at the present time there should be added to the electorate in
11For the subsequent (albeit short) war and post-war period, legal studies of state voting behavior on federal
woman suffrage have found correlative evidence in support of the importance of state sex ratios for state support
of universal woman suffrage. According to Jones (1991), high sex ratio states in the period 1915-1919 were more
likely to vote in favor of federal woman suffrage.
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this great State 1,700,000 voters, (an equal number to the male vote cast at the last Presidential
election,) untrained to take part in public affairs, unaccustomed to the exercise of the franchise,
unaccustomed to think seriously of political problems, ... the movement toward unification of
the country in the vigorous effective prosecution of the war [would be] seriously weakened.” Also
at federal level, and right after the Civil War, the titled sex ratios in the American West had
been linked to the issue of woman suffrage. When the US Congress in the late 1860’s considered
proposals for extending the franchise to women, some proponents argued for testing the franchise
first in the Western territories. One of the reasons put forward for this scheme was that woman
suffrage could lessen the twin problems of deficit women in the West and surplus women in the
East (a result of the Civil War and male migration to the West), by inducing greater numbers of
eastern women to follow the trail into the West (see, for example, Larson, 1970).
As is evident, the relative size of the female to-be-enfranchised population has been a factor in
male deliberations on the virtues and costs of granting woman access to the ballot. And high sex
ratios in the West were acknowledged by contemporaries to effectively put a limit on the size of
the vote and influence that women could exert. If indeed of consequence for the timing and spread
of woman suffrage across US states, then sex ratios and rates of woman suffrage adoption should
be positively correlated. Figure 1 provides such correlative evidence. It shows that the sex ratio
in a state that adopted woman suffrage generally tended to exceed the sex ratios found on average
in states that were at risk of extending the franchise to women in that year of adoption (solid
line - plotted until 1919 only). Although this feature is particularly pronounced for the states and
territories in the American West, it is clearly discernable in later times also for the non-Western
states and territories, albeit to a somewhat lesser degree: of all nineteen non-western states that
introduced woman suffrage prior to 1920, twelve had sex ratios in excess of the respective annual
average across all states (including those in the West) that were at risk of introducing woman
suffrage; if the latter is calculated instead only for non-western states, then this figure increases to
fourteen (out of nineteen).12 State sex ratios hence provide a factor that can potentially explain
not only the early and sustained lead of the American West in the enfranchisement of women, but
also the differential rates of suffrage adoption across states in the United States more generally.
High sex ratios may have furthered the adoption of woman suffrage also for other reasons than
just a lower perceived risk to political stability and social cohesion. At least in the early years,
some state legislators in the West considered woman suffrage also as ”a kind of political bait to lure
women from the East” (Grimes, 1967, p. xi), as did some Congressmen who supported the testing
12It is also telling that of the 19 states in which women could only vote from 1920, the seven states whose
legislatures approved the amendment to the US constitution (Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia) had an average sex ratio among their 15 to 49 olds of 104:100
in 1920, while those who did not had an average sex ratio of only 99:100.
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Fig. 1: Woman suffrage adoption by states and state sex ratios, 1869-1920
of woman suffrage in the territories. Furthermore, high sex ratios, by increasing female bargaining
power in the domestic sphere, may have induced men, and particular male legislators, to more
readily grant support for the woman suffrage cause or to oppose the same less vigorously.13 There
are several examples which suggest that such a causal pathway may have played a role at times in
the struggle for woman suffrage. Council President W. H. Bright of Carter county of the Wyoming
territorial legislature who introduced the woman suffrage bill that was to make Wyoming the pi-
oneer of woman suffrage in the United States in 1869, was reportedly strongly influenced in his
decision by his wife, which supported woman suffrage (for details of various accounts, see Grimes,
1967, p. 54-55). And in the process of ratifying the Nineteenth Amendment, with but one state
short of the thirty-six states required for amending the constitution, Tennessee in the summer of
1920 finally tipped the balance, reportedly ”... the result of one twenty-four-year-old legislator
from the mountains, Harry Burn, changing his vote at the insistance of his elderly mother, Febb
King Ensminger Burn... ” (Wheeler, 1995, p. 19).
13A voluminous literature in economics has explored the importance of sex ratios for the relative bargaining
power of men and women, producing evidence in support of their importance for marriage market, labor market,
and fertility outcomes (see, for example, Angrist, 2002, or Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle, 2004). Sex ratios have also
been shown to affect electoral outcomes in the US, as voting patterns of man and women diverged in recent decades
creating a ”political gender gap” (see Edlund and Pande, 2002).
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Certainly, other factors, often of more idiosyncratic or temporary nature, may have played a role
in the decision of individual states to extend the franchise to women. In some states, strong
liquor and brewing interests opposed woman suffrage, and sometimes even organized anti-suffrage
campaigns, as women were seen as ardent supporters of prohibition (Grimes, 1967). In others,
a strong industrial base at times provided a potent source of opposition. Business interests were
generally hostile to woman suffrage for fear that female voters would oppose child labor and more
generally back more rigid labor standards (Flexner, 1975, McDonagh and Price, 1985). Alleged
potential opponents include also the foreign-born who are reported to often have voted against
woman suffrage in public referendums (Anthony and Harper, 1902). Mormons in Utah and Indi-
ana, in turn, may have seen woman suffrage as a means to show to the nation that their women,
despite the practice of polygamy, were not suppressed, hoping to thereby pre-empt any potential
coercive action by Congress against this practice (Grimes, 1967). These and other factors will need
adequate consideration in an empirical analysis that seeks to unearth the driving forces behind
woman suffrage in the United States.
3 Econometric Method and Data
To analyze the driving forces behind the spread of woman suffrage across US states, we estimate
discrete time duration models (see Allison, 1982 or Jenkins, 1995 for excellent overviews). Let hit
denote the conditional hazard rate of adopting suffrage in state i at time t given that suffrage has
not yet been introduced. We choose the following specification for the hazard rate:
hit = 1− exp[−exp(αt + β′Xit)], (1)
where Xit is a vector of covariates. Equation 1 can then be solved for the complementary log-log
function:
log[−log(1− hit)] = αt + β′Xit. (2)
The complementary log-logistic regression model is widely used in empirical work because it is the
discrete time representation of the continuous time proportional hazard model (cf. Prentice and
Gloeckler, 1978).14 Throughout the analysis, we cluster standard errors at the state level to allow
for a shared error component.
We use annual, state-level data and focus on the time period between 1866 (the first year after
the devastating civil war) and 1919 (when Congress passed the Nineteenth Amendment, ratification
took place in 1920). Broad historical trends such as the spread of democratic and equalitarian ethic
14Alternatively, one could choose a logistic specification of the hazard function. Since results of the two specifica-
tions are almost identical, we will only report results for the complementary log-log case.
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will affect the hazard of woman suffrage adoption in all states: for instance, the period after the
adoption of woman suffrage in Idaho (1896) became known among suffragists as the ‘doldrums’,
as not a single state enfranchised its women in the first decade of the 20th century; in contrast,
suffrage adoption clustered strikingly in the second half of the 1910s (see Figure 1). Such broad
historical trends are empirically captured by changes in the baseline hazard at. Since theory
offers little guidance on choosing a functional form for at, we opt for a semi-parametric approach
and assume that the baseline hazard is piecewise constant, i.e. constant within a specified time
interval, but do not impose further functional form assumptions. The exact choice of these time
intervals should honor broad historical trends. However, at least one change in suffrage status
also has to occur within each interval (otherwise, the corresponding period dummy would predict
failure perfectly). Given this technical contraint, we choose the following four time intervals for
our baseline regressions: 1866-1884, 1885-1899, 1900-1914, 1915-1919. However, we will also test
the robustness of our findings to the choice of the baseline hazard’s functional form.
Our dichotomous endogenous variable (woman suffrage) is constructed on the basis of infor-
mation from several sources (see Table A-1 in the appendix). The explanatory variables (Xit)
are mainly taken from the five volume publication The Historical Statistics of the United States
(Carter et al., 2006), which updated and extended the widely used third edition of 1975. The data
primarily comes from the seven decennial censuses between 1860 and 1920. Values for inter-census
years are inferred using linear interpolation.15 We use data only for the 48 contiguous US states
(i.e. exclude Alaska and Hawaii). Overall, observations in our data total 2297.
Our main explanatory variable of interest is the ”adult” sex ratio of a jurisdiction, that is a state
or territory, which we define in our baseline regressions as the number of men aged 15-49 per 100
women in the same age cohort. We have chosen to exclude both the very young and the very old:
the former, as they were too young to vote for years to come, if women were granted access to the
ballot, and because they were also too young to already influence marriage market conditions; and
the latter, because they were in all likelihood too old to exert a significant influence on marriage
market conditions. In this age bracket, sex ratio imbalances, if indeed of importance for rates of
suffrage adoption along the causal pathways suggested (political risk, enhanced female bargaining
power, and attracting eastern women), should exert their greatest influence.16 Specifically, and as
argued in Section 2.2, we expect the sex ratio to increase the hazard of adopting woman suffrage.
15Some of the explanatory variables, especially state-level population figures by gender and age, are only available
from 1870 onwards. Values for the time period 1866 to 1869 are obtained by linear extrapolation.
16We conduct various robustness checks, however, in that we use also alternative definitions of the sex ratio that
are based on different age brackests.
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In addition, we control for several factors that have been noted in the (non-economic) literature
to be of potential importance for the spread of woman suffrage at particular times or in particular
regions. We consider four broad categories of variables: measures of the population composition
of a state or territory, measures of the economic structure of a jurisdiction and the economic
power of woman living therein, a measure of the legislative/procedural difficulty of extending
the suffrage (territorial status), and regional indicators to account for unobserved (and time-
invariant) characteristics that may affect rates of woman suffrage adoption at the level of individual
jurisdictions (e.g. ”western equalitarianism”).
Population Indices: A first set of covariates seeks to capture compositional characteristics
of a state’s population that have been suggested to potentially affect rates of suffrage adoption.
Specifically, we control for the percentage of non-white and foreign-born individuals in a state.
According to Anthony and Harper (1902), the foreign-born were regularly over-represented among
those opposing woman suffrage in public referenda. We also include separate variables for the
respective percentages of individuals that are born in Italy, in Ireland, and in Germany. Among
Irish- and Italian-born Americans, the traditional view that a woman’s appropriate place is in the
domestic rather than in the public sphere was particularly pronounced, which made these groups on
average less supportive of the woman suffrage cause (McDonagh and Price, 1985).17 The percentage
of Americans born in Germany in a jurisdiction has also been argued to have diminished the
probability of a state to adopt woman suffrage. For the suffrage movement was closely intertwined
with the prohibition movement, which was fiercely opposed by German-born Americans ”for whom
successful brewing was a distinctive cultural accomplishment” (Grimes, 1967, p. 116). In Utah,
for instance, the German-American Alliance representing brewers’ interests actively fought against
prohibition and the woman suffrage movement (Harper, 1922). In contrast, Mormons tended to be
generally supportive of woman suffrage (McDonagh and Price, 1985). In particular, the very early
adoption in 1870 of woman suffrage in Utah has been linked to the local dominance of Mormons.
Grimes (1967) argues that the adoption was a calculated move on part of the Mormon hierarchy.
”To the Mormons, there could be no better way of proving that their system of polygamy was
not degrading to woman [...] than to declare woman suffrage in Utah” (cf. Grimes, 1967, p. 33).
Woman suffrage is also said to have protected the power of Mormons against the influx of newly
arriving non-Mormon immigrants that were mostly unmarried men. To account for these influences,
we include in our regression analysis a covariate which records the relative number of Mormons to
the total number of individuals that were members of a religious denomination in a state.18 We
17The fraction of Irish- and Italian-born residents in a jurisdiction should also be correlated with the percentage
of Roman catholics in a state.
18Figures about church membership are only available from the US Census Bureau for the years 1890, 1906, 1916
and 1926. For 1870, we approximated the relative importance of Mormons by their relative number of sittings in a
15
also control for the urbanization rate of a jurisdiction, i.e. the percentage of individuals that live in
an urban area, and for its population density. Urban areas played a major role in the fight against
the woman suffrage movement as many of the opposing forces (such as the liquor industry but also
foreign-born Americans) gathered in cities (Grimes, 1967). Of course, inhabitants of urban areas
may also have been more progressive in terms of their social values and family practices, which
ceteris paribus should have increased the probability of highly urbanized states to enact woman
suffrage. And for both advocates (e.g. women organizations) and opponents of woman suffrage,
organizational costs might have been lower in urban than in rural areas (Stigler, 1971), so that the
expected net effect of urbanization on the timing of woman suffrage is a priori indeterminate in
sign. Population density, in turn, is likely to correlate with other population characteristics that
may affect the hazard of adopting woman suffrage, characteristics for which we cannot control
directly. In particular, sparsely populated areas are not equally appealing to everyone. Moreover,
population density should, at least to some extent, capture the frontier equalitarianism explanation
for woman suffrage, according to which nature was the great equalizer in the West.
Economic Structure: A second set of covariates relates to the economic structure of a juris-
diction. We include land in farms expressed both in per-capita terms and as a share in the total
area of a state. Both variables measure the importance of the agricultural base for a jurisdiction.
The latter variable will also be indicative of the degree to which land has been cultivated in a
state and hence may capture in part any potential influence of frontier equalitarianism. We also
control for the percentage of gainful workers aged 10 or above that are engaged in manufacturing,
in mechanical, and in mining industries. Manufacturing interest are generally viewed as a main
opponent of the woman suffrage movement. In particular, business interests feared that female
voters would back more rigid labor legislation in general and child labor regulation in particular
(Flexner, 1975; McDonagh and Price, 1985). A strong manufacturing sector in a jurisdiction should
therefore decrease the hazard of adopting woman suffrage. Finally, we control for the percentage
of females (aged 10 or above) that is engaged in gainful employment. This ratio proxies for the
economic power of those seeking the ballot and hence for the ability of would-be female voters to
demand their voting rights more forcefully in a jurisdiction. Apart from enhancing the bargaining
power of women, however, female economic activity may also have undermined the view among
men that womens’ appropriate place is exclusively in the domestic sphere.
Territorial Status: We include a dummy that indicates whether or not a jurisdiction is
a territory. As noted in Section 2, historians have argued that the West took a lead in the
enfranchisement of women partly because many Western jurisdictions had only territorial status.
On the one hand, the barriers for adopting woman suffrage were generally lower in territories than
state. Missing values were then inferred by inter- and extrapolation.
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in states (Grimes, 1967). Whereas in states woman suffrage required a constitutional amendment
and hence usually had to be approved by the state legislature and in a public referendum, in
territories an approval of the legislature and the territorial governor was sufficient. On the other
hand, it has been argued that for territorial legislatures woman suffrage was an attractive and
low-cost means to publicize their jurisdiction and to increase federal support for their bid for
statehood.
Census Region Dummies: Finally, we also control for fixed region effects by including as
regressors dummies for the census regions West, Midwest, South, and Northeast (Northeast serves
as the reference category). These indicators will capture unobserved time-invariant factors shared
by states in a census region. If, as a result of the early frontier conditions, the notion of equality
was generally further developed in the West than in the other regions, this effect on the hazard of
adopting woman suffrage should be captured by these census region dummies.
Table 1 provides descriptives statistics by census region for selective census years. The table
shows that the West differed from the other census regions in several respects. First, in 1870, 8
out of the 11 jurisdictions in the West had territorial status. In contrast, in the same year only
2 of the 37 non-Western contiguous jurisdictions had not yet become a state. By 1890, however,
most of the Western jurisdictions had been successful in their bid for statehood.
The population indices, in turn, show that the Western jurisdictions remained sparsely pop-
ulated even in 1910. Compared to the Midwest and the Northeast, the urbanization rate in the
West was relatively low in 1870. However, it caught up quickly and significantly thereafter. The
percentage of foreign-born Americans in the West, in turn, was relatively high in 1870 but declined
in the following years. The percentage of Italian-, Irish- and German-born Americans, in contrast,
was not exceptionally high in the West. But the share of Mormons in Western jurisdictions was far
larger. However, the importance of the Mormon church differed considerably between jurisdictions
in the West. Mormons were the dominant religious denomination in Utah and Idaho but they were
only weakly represented in California, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington.
Particularly striking are the inter-region differences in the sex ratio. In 1870, the average ratio
of men to woman (aged 15-49) in a Western jurisdiction was 330:100. This compares to a ratio of
126:100 in the Midwest, 95:100 in the Northeast and just 93:100 in the South. While the sex ratio
in the West declined markedly in later decades, it was still well above those found in the other
census regions in 1910. Importantly, and in contrast to the percentage of Mormons, a very high
sex ratio was characteristic for all Western jurisdictions except Utah and New Mexico.
Turning to the economic structure variables, it comes as no surprise that the percentage of
land in farms was tiny in the West. This mainly reflects the fact that great parts of the West were
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still not settled or only sparsely populated. Expressed in per capita terms the agricultural base
in the West was comparable to those in the other census regions. Manufacturing and mechanical
industries were relatively more important in the West than in the South and in the Midwest,
but somewhat less important than in the Northeast. Finally, compared to the Northeast and the
South, the percentage of females in gainful employment was relative low in the West (and also in
the Midwest). The descriptive evidence hence already suggests tentatively that neither the absence
of opposing business interests nor the economic power of women are likely to have been important
factors for the success of the woman suffrage movement in the West.
4 Results
4.1 Main Results
We start with estimating a complementary log-logistic regression model that includes as covariates
only the sex ratio and the period dummies. The results are shown in Table 2 (Model 1). In line
with our theoretical prediction, the sex ratio enters with a positive sign and is highly statistically
significant. The coefficient estimate implies that an increase in the sex ratio by one percentage
point is associated with an increase in the hazard of adopting woman suffrage of 0.6 per cent
(= exp(0.006) − 1).19 The coefficient estimates of the time period dummies furthermore suggest
that the woman suffrage movement has gained momentum over time. In particular, compared
to earlier years, jurisdictions were much more likely to enact woman suffrage laws in the years
following the outbreak of World War I.
We proceed by adding sequentially further (sets of) covariates to the baseline specification. In
Models 2 and 3, we add population indices and covariates that describe the economic structure
of a state. And in Models 4 and 5, we further add dummies for territorial status and for census
region. In all four models, the sex ratio exerts a robust positive and statistically significant effect
on the hazard rate. Its coefficient estimate increases markedly when we account for inter-state
differences in population composition and in economic structure. In the most elaborate model
specification (Model 5), a one percentage point increase in the sex ratio increases the hazard
of adopting woman suffrage by about 2.5 per cent. Regarding the population indices, we find a
sizeable and statistically significant negative effect of the percentage of nonwhites on the probability
that a state enacts woman suffrage. The percentage of German- and Irish-born Americans also
both enter with the expected negative sign. While the effect for the German-born Americans is
mostly statistically insignificant, the negative effect of the Irish-born Americans is statististically
19The complementary log-logistic regression model is the discrete time representation of the continuous time
proportional hazard model. The estimated regression coefficients are hence equivalent to the coefficients from the
underlying proportional hazard model and the exponentiated coefficients can be interpreted as hazard ratios.
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significant once we account for the economic structure of a jurisdiction. There is some evidence
for a positive effect of Italian immigrants on the success probability of the woman suffrage cause
(Model 5). While this finding is surprising given our (and others’) priors, it is consistent with
results presented by McDonagh and Price (1985) who do not find Italians to be a major source of
opposition in woman suffrage referenda. Our results furthermore show that the urbanization rate
has a statistically significant positive effect on the hazard rate. This finding could testify to the
conjecture that those living in cities were indeed more progressive in terms of their social values
and family practices. The population density of a state, in contrast, does not influence the hazard.
Finally, the share of Mormons has the expected positive effect in all specifications.
Turning next to the set of variables which describe aspects of the economic structure of a
jurisdiction, we find neither of the two measures of land in farms to exhibit a statistically significant
association with the hazard rate. However, the percentage of gainful workers in manufacturing
exerts a strong and highly significant negative effect on the hazard of adopting woman suffrage.
Manufacturing interests therefore seem to have been a major impediment to the woman suffrage
cause. Finally, and in contrast, we find that (potential) economic power of those seeking the
franchise, as measured by the percentage of women that is gainfully employed, indeed increases,
all else equal, the probability of a jurisdiction to pass woman suffrage legislation.
Territorial status of a jurisdiction does not prove to increase the hazard of adopting woman
suffrage. The respective coefficient estimate is even negative but statistically insignificant. We
therefore do not find supportive evidence for the hypotheses that greater procedural ease in enacting
woman suffrage in territories or territories’ alleged deliberate use of woman suffrage as a means to
gather support in Washington for their bid for statehood had a positive effect on the rate at which
jurisdictions granted women access to the ballot.
Finally, there is evidence that unobserved time-invariant factors shared by jurisdictions within a
census region had an affect on the timing of the spread of female voting rights. However, the results
of Model 5 suggest that - after controlling for observable characteristics - it was the Northeastern
rather than the Western states that were the odd ones out in the Union: the states in the West, in
the Midwest, and in the South all display a markedly higher average probability of adopting woman
suffrage than those that are located in the Northeast. While the coefficient estimate of the dummy
for the American West is somewhat larger than the corresponding estimates for the South and for
the Midwest, the differences between these coefficients are not statistically significant. Given that
we also find neither the sparse population density nor the low level of land cultivation in the West
to be important determinants of the rate at which jurisdictions granted women access to the ballot,
our results provide little empirical support to the widely shared belief that frontier equalitarianism
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in the West was a major factor behind this region’s lead in the enfranchisement of women.
Table 2: Regression Results
Dependent variable: female suffrage (0/1)
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
sex ratio .006
(.002)
∗∗∗ .010
(.004)
∗∗∗ .029
(.008)
∗∗∗ .029
(.008)
∗∗∗ .025
(.009)
∗∗∗
Population indices
population density - − .013
(.011)
− .006
(.005)
− .006
(.005)
− .005
(.005)
% urban - .036
(.027)
.088
(.025)
∗∗∗ .087
(.025)
∗∗∗ .057
(.023)
∗∗
% nonwhite - − .067
(.023)
∗∗∗ − .141
(.040)
∗∗∗ − .140
(.040)
∗∗∗ − .183
(.069)
∗∗∗
% foreign born - − .034
(.046)
− .083
(.028)
∗∗∗ − .078
(.034)
∗∗ − .070
(.037)
∗
% Italian - .389
(.305)
.328
(.212)
.345
(.211)
.651
(.175)
∗∗∗
% Irish - − .144
(.467)
− .489
(.229)
∗∗ − .526
(.259)
∗∗ − .511
(.259)
∗∗
% German - − .013
(.105)
− .168
(.136)
− .191
(.162)
− .350
(.207)
∗
% Mormons - .052
(.018)
∗∗∗ .067
(.020)
∗∗∗ .066
(.019)
∗∗∗ .056
(.017)
∗∗∗
Economic structure
% land in farms - - − .015
(.010)
− .016
(.010)
− .012
(.011)
land in farms per capita - - .013
(.021)
.010
(.024)
.002
(.031)
% engaged in manufacturing - - − .113
(.030)
∗∗∗ − .115
(.030)
∗∗∗ − .087
(.033)
∗∗∗
% female gainful employment - - .127
(.078)
.116
(.082)
∗∗∗ .215
(.113)
∗
Territory dummy - - - − .603
(1.52)
− .365
(1.47)
West dummy - - - - 2.89
(.970)
∗∗∗
Midwest dummy - - - - 2.74
(.938)
∗∗∗
South dummy - - - - 2.38
(1.37)
∗
Period Dummies
1866-1884 −4.12
(.887)
∗∗∗ −4.00
(1.60)
∗∗ −3.52
(2.16)
−3.28
(1.77)
∗ −2.37
(1.82)
1885-1899 −3.67
(.739)
∗∗∗ −3.64
(1.33)
∗∗∗ −2.94
(1.16)
∗∗ −2.91
(1.12)
∗∗ −2.53
(1.37)
∗
1900-1914 −2.33
(.402)
∗∗∗ −2.39
(.484)
∗∗∗ −2.34
(.450)
∗∗∗ −2.32
(.456)
∗∗∗ −2.43
(.492)
∗∗∗
N obs 2297 2277 2277 2277 2277
N states 48 48 48 48 48
year analysis begins 1866 1866 1866 1866 1866
∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Robust standard errors clustered by jurisdiction are reported in parentheses.
Summarizing the above, we find several factors to have been influential in either accelerating
or delaying the adoption of woman suffrage. Among the former factors are the sex ratio, the
urbanization rate, the percentage of Mormons, and female gainful employment. Among the latter
are a high percentage of non-whites, of foreign borns, and of Irish-born Americans, as well as a high
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percentage of manufacturing employment in total employment. Most of these factors, however, can
not explain why the American West led the nation in the enfranchisement of women. In particular,
the West was neither characterized by a high degree of urbanization (quite to the the contrary), nor
by a large share of woman in gainful employment. Likewise, the shares of foreign-born and of Irish-
born Americans, which we find to have delayed rather than accelerated woman suffrage adoption,
was relatively high in the West, especially at the beginning of our sampling period (see Table 1).
Furthermore, business interests that may have opposed woman suffrage were anything but absent
in the West, as is evident from the comparatively high share of manufacturing employment in the
region. In fact, only the Northeastern states excelled the West on this count in any of the three
census years tabulated in Table 1 in Section 3. Hence, only the severe imbalances in the ratio
of men to woman (grantors to potential grantees of woman suffrage) and the high percentage of
Mormons in the West remain as potential candidates for explaining why the West became the
champion of woman suffrage. It is clear, however, that the importance of the Mormon church can
at the very best be only part of any explanation, as great numbers of Mormons lived only in Utah
and Idaho.20 For the sex ratio, however, the case is altogether different, as only two western states
had rather balanced numbers of men and women in the observation period: Utah, the Mormon
state, and New Mexico which introduced woman suffrage only in 1920, that is last of all states in
the West and a full 51 years after pioneering Wyoming.21
4.2 Robustness Checks
We checked the robustness of our results along a number of dimensions. As a first check, we
varied the starting date of the empirical analysis to test the importance of the earliest suffrage
states for our results, that is of Wyoming, Utah, and Washington, and to assess more generally
whether the driving forces behind extensions of the franchise to women changed in any significant
way over time. Specifically, we considered three subperiods: 1870-1919, 1880-1919, and 1890-1919.
Regression results are reported in columns 3 to 5 of Table 3. To ease comparability with our findings
reported in the previous section, the results of our fully-fledged model with period dummies for the
time period 1866-1919 are reproduced in column 2 of Table 3. For our main variable of interest,
that is the sex ratio, we continue to find a consistently positive and statistically significant effect on
the probability of a jurisdiction to grant women access to the ballot. For the subperiod 1890-1919,
our results therefore corroborate the finding of Kenny (1999) of a positive association of the sex
ratio and the rate of suffrage adoption for the more general case of sub-national jurisdictions (states
20In 1870, the average share of Mormons in western jurisdictions is no different from the shares found in other
census regions, if Utah and Idaho are excluded.
21In 1870, New Mexico had a sex ratio of only 107:100 among its residents aged 15-49. Second only to Utah in
which the sex ratio was a even a bit lower, this near balance of the sexes in New Mexico compares to an average
figure of 330:100 in the western jurisdictions in the same year.
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and territories), and for an analysis that uses both an enlarged set of controls and time varying
covariates. Moreover, the further is the starting date of the analysis moved forward in time, the
larger in magnitude becomes the point estimate. For the latest subperiod considered (1890 to 1919),
the coefficient estimate in fact more than doubles in size compared to our baseline estimate for the
unrestricted time period (1866-1919). However, it is also estimated somewhat less precisely. For the
other variables, estimated coefficients change little, at least in qualitative terms. A higher degree of
urbanization and a higher fraction of Mormons still appear to be promoters of female voting rights.
Similarly, the percentage of nonwhites and Irish-born Americans, as well as the fraction of workers
that are engaged in manufacturing continue to be associated with a lower hazard rate of adopting
woman suffrage in each of the three subperiods considered. And female gainful employment still
enters with a positive coefficient, but it is now no longer statistically significant in two of the three
subperiods, including the latest (1890-1919). Unobserved time-invariant characteristics of census
regions, in turn, appear to have played less of a role in later periods. Estimated coefficients in fact
decline in magnitude, the further the starting date of the analysis is moved forward in time. When
restricting the estimation sample to the time span between 1890 and 1919 (the latest subperiod
considered), none of the census region dummies remains statistically significant. In other words,
the Northeast ceases to be the odd region out, and the regional affiliation of a jurisdiction no longer
has any predictive power for its rate of adoption of woman suffrage.
As a second robustness check, we changed the functional form of the baseline hazard. As argued
in previous sections, the increasing success over time of the woman suffrage movement could have
been driven by broader historical forces such as the spread of democratic and equalitarian ethics.
The baseline hazard is meant to capture such aggregate time-varying influences that are not specific
to particular jurisdictions. In the previous regressions, we adopted a semi-parametric approach and
assumed that the baseline hazard is piecewise constant. While such an approach has the distinctive
advantage that it does not impose a functional form assumption on the overall shape of the hazard,
it requires the baseline hazard to be constant within a specified time interval. As a robustness
check we therefore drop this assumption and instead use a parametric approach. Columns 5 and
6 of Table 3 show the estimation results for specifications that parameterizes the baseline hazard
respectively as the logarithm of time and as a third-order polynomial of time.22 As is evident,
the empirical results are generally robust to these changes in the functional form of the baseline
hazard. In particular, an increase in the sex ratio continues to be associated with a higher hazard
rate of adopting woman suffrage. Moreover, the estimation results also continue to indicate that
the hazard rate is negatively affected by the percentage of nonwhites and by the share of manu-
22The logarithmic specification of the baseline hazard can be thought of being the discrete-time analogue to the
continuous time Weibull model.
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facturing workers, and positively correlated with the percentage of Mormons in a jurisdiction.
However, the results do no longer support the conjecture that the presence of Irish-born Americans
in a jurisdiction has tended to delay the adoption of woman suffrage.
Third, we checked the robustness of our results to the inclusion of further explanatory vari-
ables.23 To proxy for the general openness and accessibility of the political system of a jurisdiction,
we added covariates on voting laws and regulations. Specifically, we included indicator variables
for whether a jurisdiction in a particular year levied poll taxes, made voting conditional on passing
a prior literacy test, or used the secret ballot. However, none of these variables proved statistically
significant. We also tested for the presence and importance of potential contagion effects by means
of a dummy that indicates whether a neighboring jurisdiction in a particular year has already
adopted woman suffrage. While we do find some evidence for such positive spill-overs effects, our
findings again prove robust to the inclusion of such proxies.24
Fourth, we dropped or replaced some of the explanatory variables and tested the robustness
of our results to alternative definitions of the sex ratio. Specifically, we first replaced the share
of non-whites as a regressor with the share of blacks and dropped the Mormon dummy from the
analysis. But neither of these changes affected the coefficient estimate of the sex ratio materially
or rendered it statistically insignificant. Next, we changed the definition of the sex ratio measure
used by considering different age brackets. Specifically, we considered the ratios of men to women
among those aged 20 to 49 and among those aged 20 or older. The latter age cohort measures more
accurately the immediate would-be electorate if women were granted access to the ballot, as the
general voting age at the time was twenty-one. For both measures, however, estimation results are
again virtually identical to those of our baseline regression. This finding comes at little surprise,
as the three sex ratios measures are very highly correlated in the data: the correlation coefficients
between any pair of the three sex ratio measures all exceed 0.98.
Fifth, we checked whether our original regional classification of the American West is crucial
for our results. Specifically, we combined the eleven states of the census region West and the
twelve states of the census region Midwest into one large western region and replaced our two
indicator variables for West and Midwest in the regression analysis with an indicator for this
broader definition of the American West. Parts of the Midwest were also settled late and exhibited
features similar to those found in the West. In particular, as documented in Table 1 in Section
3, the Midwest also exhibited a comparatively high sex ratio throughout the observation period.
However, this change in the classification of the American West is without consequence for our
23The respective regression outputs for this and the following robustness checks can be obtained from the authors
upon request.
24It has to be noted, however, that the contagion indicator shows considerably overlap with the dummy for the
Western census region. The former indicator may therefore in part capture the influence of the latter, rather than
pure contagion effects.
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results.
Finally, we checked whether the treatment in our analysis of states that granted woman suffrage
only in 1919 or 1920 matters for our results. First, we excluded the year 1919 from our analysis,
as states which adopted woman suffrage in that year (Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri,
Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin) might have in part done so because they anticipated the success of
the struggle for universal woman suffrage at the federal level. And as a second check, we extended
the period of analysis to include the year 1920 and denoted those seven states that ratified the 19th
Amendment (Kentucky, Massachussetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
and West Virginia) as voluntary grantors of woman suffrage, treating the remaining twelve state
that did not ratify the amendment as censored. In both cases, the results we obtain are virtually
identical to our baseline findings.
5 Conclusion
While the modern woman suffrage movements in the United States came out of the East, it were
the Western states that led the nation in the enfranchisement of woman. It was not New York,
arena for the Seneca Falls Convention and home of the National Woman Suffrage Association, but
remote and sparsely populated Wyoming territory that first adopted woman suffrage. And it was
not Massachussetts, where the American Woman Suffrage Association resided, that followed but
the Mountain states Utah, Colorado or Idaho. In fact, until the outbreak of World War I, woman
suffrage essentially remained a regional phenomenon confined to the American West. In this paper
we have argued that the general shortage of woman in the West was decisive for the pioneering
role and the continuing lead of the Western states in the adoption of woman suffrage. As the
settlement of the Frontier was strongly male-dominated, sex ratios in the West were drastically
skewed toward men. And with women being a scarcity, the net benefit of adopting woman suffrage
was much higher for the (male) grantors of voting rights in the West: woman suffrage carried
lower potential costs to men in terms of risks and any devaluation of their political influence; and
for legislators in the West, woman suffrage had the added benefit of potentially attracting female
settlers. In addition, the few woman in the West were much sought after and their bargaining
power hence in all likelihood higher than in other US regions.
Historical census data strongly support our conjecture. States in which women were scarce en-
franchised their women much earlier than states in which the ratio of men to women was more
balanced. Estimating discrete time duration models, we found a highly significant and positive
effect of the sex ratio on the hazard of adopting woman suffrage. This association is robust both
to the inclusion of a wide range of covariates that have been discussed in the relevant historical
25
literature and to numerous checks, including changes in regression specifications, the use of alter-
native and additional covariates, or variations in the period of analysis considered. This is not to
say that differences in state-level sex ratios were the only driving force behind the spread of woman
suffrage across the US. In fact, we find ample evidence that other factors were also influential for
the timing of suffrage adoption. Strong business interests, for instance, may in part explain why
the mature societies in the East proved to be laggards with respect to woman suffrage. And the
early enfranchisement of women in Utah may well have been driven in large part by the local dom-
inance of the Mormon church. We also find compositional characteristics of a state’s population
to have played a role in the decision to adopt woman suffrage: a high percentage of foreign borns
generally tended to delay woman suffrage adoption, as did a high share of Irish-born Americans.
However, while these factors certainly played a role in specific states at certain times, only the
strong and sustained imbalances in the sex ratio can explain the marked and sustained regional
pattern of state level extensions of the franchise to women in the United States.
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Table A-1: Historical dates for contiguous US states and territories
Jurisdiction: Year of admission as: Changes in voting laws (dates/periods) in 1870-1920:
territory state woman suffrage secret ballot poll tax literacy test
I. West:
Arizona 1863 1912 1912 1891 – 1912 -
California – 1850 1911 1891 – 1894 -
Colorado 1861 1876 1893 1891 – –
Idaho 1863 1890 1896 1891 – –
Montana 1864 1889 1914 1889 – –
Nevada 1861 1864 1914 1891 - 1910 –
New Mexico 1850 1912 1920 1912 – –
Oregon 1848 1859 1912 1891 – –
Utah 1850 1896 18703 1896 – –
Washington 1853 1889 18833 1890 – 1896 -
Wyoming 1868 1890 1869 1890 – 1889 -
II. Midwest:
Illinois 1809 1818 19131 1891 – –
Indiana 1800 1816 19191 1889 – –
Iowa 1838 1846 19191 1892 – –
Kansas 1854 1861 1912 1893 – –
Michigan 1805 1837 1918 1891 – –
Minnesota 1849 1858 19191 1891 – –
Missouri 1812 1821 19191 1891 – –
Nebraska 1854 1867 19171 1891 – –
North Dakota 1861 1889 19171 1891 – –
Ohio 1787 1803 19191 1891 – –
South Dakota 1861 1889 1918 1891 – –
Wisconsin 1836 1848 19191 1894 – –
III. Northeast:
Connecticut – 1788 1920 1909 – throughout
Maine – 1820 19191 1891 – 1892 -
Massachusetts – 1788 1920 1888 - 1891 throughout
New Hampshire – 1788 1920 1891 – 1902 -
New Yersey – 1787 1920 1911 – –
New York – 1788 1917 1895 – –
Pennsylvania – 1787 1920 1891 throughout –
Rhode Island – 1790 19171 1889 - 1888 –
Vermont – 1791 1920 1890 – –
IV. South:
Alabama 1817 1819 1920 1893 1901 - 1901 -
Arkansas 1819 1836 19172 1891 1891 - –
Delaware – 1787 1920 1891 - 1907 1897 -
Florida 1822 1845 1920 1895 1889 - –
Georgia – 1788 1920 1922 throughout 1908 -
Kentucky – 1792 1920 1882 – –
Louisiana 1804 1812 1920 1896 1898 - 1898 -
Maryland – 1788 1920 1892 –
Mississippi 1798 1817 1920 1890 1889 - 1890 -
North Carolina – 1789 1920 1929 1899 - 1920 1900 -
Oklahoma 1890 1907 1918 1890 – 1912 -
South Carolina – 1788 1920 1950 1895 - 1895 -
Tennessee 1790 1796 19191 1921 1870, 1890 - –
Texas – 1845 19182 1905 1902 - –
Virginia – 1788 1920 1894 1875 - 82, 1902 - 1902 -
West Virginia – 1863 1920 1891 – –
Note: 1 presidential suffrage, 2 primary suffrage, 3 first year woman suffrage was adopted. In territories, voters
could vote for the territorial legislature, but not for the state governor, Congress, or US president. Sources: for
dates of admissions, Carter et al. (2006); for woman suffrage dates, Carter et al. (2006), Lott and Kenny (1999),
and McCammon et al. (2001); for dates on secret ballot/poll tax/literacy tests, Lott and Kenny (1999).
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